Employing data from a representative survey conducted in Germany, this paper examines public preferences for the size and composition of government expenditure. We focus on public attitudes towards taxes, public debt incurrence and public spending in six different policy areas. Our findings suggest, first, that individual preferences for the use of additional tax money can be categorised as either capital-oriented expenditure or public debt reduction. Second, we find that fiscal preferences differ along various dimensions. Specifically, personal economic well-being, economic literacy, confidence in politicians, political ideology and time preference are significantly related to individual attitudes towards public spending, taxes and debt. The magnitude of the effects is particularly large for time preference, economic knowledge and party preference. Third, public preferences for public spending priorities are only marginally affected when considering a public budget constraint.
INTRODUCTION
The past decade has witnessed an expansion of the public sector in most OECD countries, reflected by notably higher public expenditure and tax revenue-to-GDP ratios. 1 This trend reached a peak after the recent financial and economic crises, when governments around the world implemented fiscal stimuli in order to stabilise the business cycle. In the aftermath of this expansion, governments are finding it hard to cut back the budget again. Moreover, there has been an intensive debate over what some observers call 'austerity', the reluctance of some countries (e.g. the United Kingdom and Germany) to prolong the period of extensive deficit spending. Economists supporting 'austerity' often believe that large governments might have a detrimental impact on economic growth and social welfare (e.g. Afonso and Furceri, 2010; Barro, 1990 ; F€ olster and Henrekson, individual opinions on fiscal consolidation and public deficits. Utilising data from the same (omnibus) survey employed in this analysis, Hayo and Neumeier (2016a , 2016b , 2017 shed light on public attitudes towards different fiscal consolidation measures, the German debt brake as well as Ricardian equivalence, whereas Uhl (2014, 2015) studied individual consumption responses and labour supply reactions, respectively, to a tax change. 3 However, to date, only a few studies focus on individual attitudes towards public spending priorities. Based on survey data from the United States, Hansen (1998) , Jacoby (1994) , Mueller (1963) and Welch (1985) evaluated public attitudes towards various fiscal programmes, such as public spending on certain welfare measures, education, healthcare and defence. However, their analyses are primarily descriptive and they do not investigate the relationship between individual characteristics and fiscal policies. Hockley and Harbour (1983) employed a coupon scale questionnaire to elicit attitudes towards different public spending priorities in the United Kingdom. Compared to our study, though, their number of covariates is limited, as the authors examine only the effects of age, sex, education and wage.
Also related to our analysis are several studies by Stadelmann et al. (2013 Stadelmann et al. ( , 2014 Stadelmann et al. ( , 2015 who assessed to what extent legislators' decisions reflect voters' preferences using data from Swiss referenda. Legislators are often considered as agents trying to appeal to different principals, such as campaign contributors, political parties and different groups of voters (see Besley, 2006 for a literature review). In this regard, our analysis allows us to assess the extent to which the current fiscal policy stance matches the preferences of the national electorate.
This paper makes at least two contributions to the extant literature. First, compared to other studies that focus on public preferences for government spending priorities, we employ an unprecedentedly large number of explanatory variables in our empirical analysis, including various sociodemographic characteristics as well as indicators for interviewees' time preferences, economic literacy and confidence in politicians. This allows us to test several economically informed hypotheses and conjectures that have not yet been tested empirically. Second, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to compare individual attitudes towards fiscal programmes across two scenarios, one in which respondents are made aware of the public budget constraint and one in which unexpected funds become available. This set-up allows us to test the sensitivity of (stated) public spending preferences to the budgetary situation.
Like all research methods, however, survey analyses entail a number of drawbacks. First, we are measuring stated preferences and not revealed preferences, which are not necessarily the same. However, measurement error may occur in both directions and, thus, cancel out across the sample. Second, our respondents' answers may depend on the political and economic context. Our survey was conducted in 2013, a time at which the sovereign debt crisis in Europe was still an important topic for the media. Between 2007 and 2012, the debt-to-GDP ratio of the German general government rose from 65% to 81%. These events may have influenced the perception of fiscal policy in Germany.
Our findings suggest that a large part of the German citizenry supports the current scope of government. Put differently, majority voting would yield few changes with regard to the level of public spending on diverse policy areas or the composition of public expenditure. The only policy area in which a spending cut is preferred by a majority of respondents is defence. In the case of public spending on education, roughly 61% opt for increasing expenditure. We also find that preferences for different public spending priorities are relatively stable, irrespective of whether or not respondents consider the budget constraint. This means that the share of interviewees who opt for a spending hike in any particular policy area if unexpected additional funds become available is approximately the same as in the scenario where spending hikes involve costs. Principal component analysis reveals a clear pattern with regard to fiscal preferences. Respondents can be categorised in two groups: the first group prefers that additional funds are used for capital-oriented parts of the budget, i.e., education and infrastructure; the second group would like to see public debt reduced and is against any increase in welfare spending. With regard to the correlates of attitudes towards public spending on the individual level, we find thatinter aliaeconomic well-being, confidence in politicians, economic knowledge, and time and party preferences are significantly related to preferences for public spending, tax policy and public debt.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces the survey instrument and sets out some important descriptive statistics. Section 3 formulates and tests several hypotheses with respect to individual attitudes towards public spending priorities as well as towards taxes and public debt. This section also presents our empirical model, along with the results from ordered logit estimations. Section 4 concludes.
SURVEY INSTRUMENT AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
This specifically designed survey was conducted as part of an omnibus survey between 15 February and 1 March 2013. The sample consists of 2,042 representatively selected persons from the German population aged 14 or above. The survey employed state-of-the-art interview techniques, combining face-to-face interviews with the use of pen-pads so as to provide respondents with anonymity when answering potentially sensitive questions. The survey was conducted on our behalf by GfK, the biggest private survey institutes in Germany, specialised in market and public opinion research. Methodologically, the survey is based on quota sampling and the survey sample is representative of the general population in Germany. Given that the correspondence level between important characteristics of our sample with those of the general population is high, the analysis below is conducted without the use of population weights. The survey and the full questionnaire are described in more detail in and the variables used in this study are defined in Appendix A. The survey started by listing and briefly describing six major policy areas. The current amount of public spending devoted to these areas was given both in terms of euros per capita as well as in relation to total public spending. 4 The six policy areas covered in our survey are those on which the German government spends the most: social security, public safety and order, education, infrastructure, economic development and defence. 5 We adopted two strategies for eliciting respondents' preferences for different public spending priorities. In the first scenario (Scenario A), we asked the interviewees in which of the six aforementioned policy areas the German government should spend more and in which areas it should spend less. Those interviewees who preferred spending hikes or cuts in at least one policy area were then asked how the additional public spending should be financed or what the additional funds should be used for respectively. In both cases, three options were available: spending hikes (spending cuts) can be financed via (used for) a tax hike (tax cut), public borrowing (public debt reduction) or by a decrease (increase) in public spending in another other policy area. We allowed multiple answers, that is, the respondents could choose several policy areas in which they would prefer a change in spending. Note that the survey instrument is designed in such a way that the interviewees have to answer consistently; that is, interviewees who prefer an increase in public spending in any policy area and at the same time state that the increase should be financed via a reduction of public spending in another area were obliged to name at least one policy area in which public spending should be cut. Before the interview commenced, the scope and sequence of questions were introduced by an interviewer and the interviewee was permitted to ask questions at any time during the interview. By directly relating public spending to public revenues, we compelled interviewees to think about the public budget constraint when making their choices and, thereby, circumvented the 'more for less paradox' (Welch, 1985) . However, our decision not to use numbers to specify the public budget decisions implies that we may not be able to actually balance the budget in the end. This is a weakness in our identification scheme, but requiring respondents to fully net out the various proposed changes in government expenditures and revenues would have exceeded what can be reasonably implemented in a general survey. Here, an experimental approach might be more useful, although experiments tend to suffer from weak external validity. Figure 1 illustrates the share of people opting for spending hikes (light columns) and cuts (dark columns) in different policy areas, as well as for increases or decreases in taxes and public debt respectively.
Only 18% of the respondents opt for a tax hike or the incurrence of additional public debt in order to increase public spending. In contrast, more than 30% (40%) call for a tax cut (public debt reduction). This is an interesting finding, 4. The descriptions and figures used in the survey are given in Appendix B. 5. Note that some of the policy areas covered in our survey are mainly the responsibility of the federal government (e.g. social security, defence), while others are the responsibility of the state governments (e.g. education, public safety). However, in many cases, the competencies of the different government levels overlap. In the multivariate analysis below, we address this issue by including state-fixed effects. especially in the light of the upcoming federal election, as tax policy plays a role in the electoral campaigns of major parties in Germany. For example, some parties advocate for tax cuts (e.g. CDU, FDP), whereas left-wing parties tend to call for higher taxes, especially for high-income earners and wealthy people. Generally, expenditure cuts are also unpopular, except for defence spending, which more than 60% of the German population would like to see reduced. Note, though, that only 2.5% of total public expenditure is devoted to defence. With regard to increasing public spending, roughly 60% opt for additional expenditure on education. With respect to other policy areas, majority voting would not result in any changes in expenditure. Next, we introduce a scenario in which money comes out of the blue and, thus, fiscal adjustments are associated with no additional costs (Scenario B). Some people may regard public spending in one area as more important than spending in another, but, at the same time, be reluctant to call for a spending hike when costs are involved. To obtain some insight into whether and how consideration of the public budget constraint affects peoples' attitudes towards public spending priorities, we confronted the interviewees with the latest release of the official tax estimate, according to which the German government is going to collect €23 billion more tax revenues between 2013 and 2016 than previously expected. We then asked the respondents how the government should use these additional revenues. The choice was between increasing public spending in one of the six policy areas listed above, cutting taxes or repaying public debt. Respondents were allowed to mention a maximum of three ordered preferences. Ordering allows evaluating the relative importance respondents attach to different fiscal policy measures. The distribution of answers is illustrated in Figure 2 .
The share of people opting for a spending hike in any particular policy area is roughly equal to the scenario in which respondents were required to take the public budget constraint into account. Whether this reflects a valid finding or a weakness of our identification scheme is not clear. Assuming the former, we Figure 1 Preferences for public spending priorities when accounting for the public budget constraint (Scenario A)distribution of answers conclude that preferences for different public spending priorities appear relatively stable, irrespective of whether spending hikes involve a budget constraint. However, we see a different picture when looking at preferences as to taxes and public debt. In the first scenario, about 32% of the interviewees opt for a tax cut. But when unexpected funds are available, more than half the respondents prefer to use them to decrease the tax burden. With regard to public debt, only 42% prefer consolidation efforts when this implies that spending needs to be cut, as compared to 54% when unexpected tax revenues can be used for this purpose. Hence, respondents are more willing to cut taxes and repay debt if no costs are involved, indicating that they prefer not to reduce the scope of government.
Arguably, the fact that fiscal consolidation is more popular when additional funds become available could also be interpreted as loss aversion, i.e., people are more willing to forego additional spending than to accept spending cuts. We utilise the answers to the question about how to spend the additional tax revenues (Scenario B) to construct spending profiles in Germany. A similar approach is taken by Bonica (2015) , who studies spending preferences in the United States under hypothetical spending constraints. Using principal components analysis, he finds a tradeoff between security and non-security spending and between relative preference for rival and non-rival government goods and services. A major drawback of his analysis is that it is based on a non-representative survey of students.
Based on the ranked preferences for the various fiscal alternatives, we construct an ordered fiscal priority variable, where we assign a value of 0 when a component was not mentioned by a respondent, 1 when it was ranked as a third priority, 2 when it was ranked as a second priority, and 3 when it was ranked as a first priority. Given the ordered nature of our budgeting priorities, we employ principal component analysis accounting for that fact that each of the variables has only four ranked categories (see Kolenikov and Angeles, 2004) . The scree plot as well as the difference between eigenvalues suggests concentrating the analysis Figure 2 Preferences for public spending priorities when unexpected funds can be used (Scenario B)distribution of answers on the first two components. 6 Table 1 presents the loadings of the various fiscal policy preferences on the two principal components. To properly differentiate between the principal components, we focus on variable loadings equal to or greater than 0.4 (marked in bold). The two profiles for fiscal preferences can be interpreted fairly easily. The first component reflects the desire to increase spending on education and infrastructure, which are the main capital-oriented parts of the budget and reflect physical and human capital. Note that this is a spending-oriented preference, as the possibility of cutting taxes loads negatively on this component. Thus, we call this fiscal preference 'capital-spending-oriented'. The second component loads highly positively on the item 'repay debt' and highly negatively on 'increase social security spending'. Thus, respondents with this preference profile believe the additional tax revenues should be used for fiscal consolidation. Moreover, they would rather not have the tax money spent on social security, which already makes up the largest part of public expenditure in Germany. This suggests that those with this fiscal profile consider spending on social security as one of the main factors leading to public debt. Thus, we call this fiscal preference 'fiscalconsolidation-oriented'.
These two components reflect different views about the role of government in the economy. The capital-spending-oriented view is based on the idea that government can play an important part in the economy if expenditure is directed towards specific categories. In economics, this view is reflected, for instance, in the endogenous growth literature. The fiscal-consolidation-oriented view is more sceptical about government's potential to affect the economy in a positive way and is especially dubious of a large welfare state. In economics, this reflects more market-oriented approaches to organising the economy. 6. The first two eigenvalues are 1.8 and 1.4 respectively. The difference between the first and the second eigenvalue is 0.37; it is 0.18 between the second and the third eigenvalue and 0.03 between the third and the fourth eigenvalue. The cumulated explained variance of the first two principal components as a share of the total variance is 0.35. In addition, the other principal components are less readily interpretable.
DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS PUBLIC SPENDING PRIORITIES

Empirical approach
We now turn to the individual-level analysis of preferences for different public spending priorities. The main part of our analysis utilises the two principal components identified in section 2 as dependent variables. In economic terms, we identify the most important correlates describing two clearly interpretable attitudes towards fiscal policy, namely, 'capital-spending orientation' and 'fiscal-consolidation orientation'. Our empirical model is:
where the subscript i refers to the interviewee and j = (1, 2) to the respective principal component.
x is a vector of explanatory variables, a the vector of coefficients, and ɛ is the error term. To facilitate interpretation of our estimates, we standardise the principal components by subtracting their means and dividing by their standard deviations. We employ OLS regressions to estimate Equation (1).
As an extension and to glean further insights, we also study the determinants of individual attitudes towards public spending in each single policy area, taxes and public debt, separately by estimating two additional regressions. First, we focus on the scenario where interviewees had to take the public budget constraint into account (Scenario A). We set-up the following empirical model:
where y Ã i;k represents a latent continuous variable. The subscript k refers to the policy area. We estimate eight specifications of Equation (2), one for social security, public safety, education, infrastructure, economic development, defence, taxes and public debt. 7 l is a placeholder for the potential realisations of the discrete variable y i,k and can take one of three values: À1 if the respondent opts for a spending cut in area k (a tax cut/public debt reduction), 1 if the respondent chooses an increase (a tax hike/additional public debt incurrence), or 0 if the respondent prefers to maintain the current level of spending (tax amount/level of public debt).
Second, we study variables related to respondents' relative preferences. In the following equation, we focus on the scenario where additional public funds become available unexpectedly (Scenario B).
The main difference from Equation (2) is that the discrete variable z i,k can take on one of four values: 3 if the respondent chooses the respective policy measure 7. Due to its high degree of heterogeneity, we do not use the miscellaneous expenditure category in the regression models below.
i.e., a reduction of taxes or public debt or a spending hike in any policy areaas his or her first preference, 2 if the respondent chooses it as the second preference, 1 if the respondent mentions it as a third preference, or 0 if the policy measure is not mentioned at all. We use ordered logit regressions to estimate Equations (2) and (3). Like all research methods, our survey-based approach may have a few drawbacks. First, we are measuring stated preferences and not revealed behaviour, which are not necessarily the same. However, deviations may occur in both directions and thus cancel out across the sample. Second, the estimates we obtain based on the regression analyses clearly do not have a causal interpretation. We believe, though, that identifying the most important correlates of fiscal preferences is both informative and policy relevant.
Explanatory variables and research hypotheses
There is not much theoretical or empirical research into variables that are related to individual demand for publicly provided goods and services. Thus, our analysis is to some extent explorative and the choice of explanatory variables is thus somewhat conjectural. Note that the set of covariates considered in our analysis is similar to the ones used in Hayo and Neumeier (2016a , 2016b , 2017 . 8
Economic well-being
Personal economic situation may affect individual preferences for public spending priorities in various ways. Both theoretical (e.g. Meltzer and Richard, 1981) as well as empirical public choice approaches (e.g. Alesina and Giuliano, 2009; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Corneo and Gr€ uner, 2002) suggest that those who are relatively better-off tend to prefer less public spending on redistributive policies. In this regard, the label 'redistributive' is typically applied to publicly provided goods and services that are (i) financed through proportional or progressive income tax, (ii) 'private' in the sense that they are typically characterised by excludability and/ or rivalry and (iii) provided by the government free of charge (e.g. Besley and Coate, 1991) . Public spending on social security and public education are commonly considered prime examples of redistributive policies. Social security spending directly benefits those living in poor economic conditions. Public spending on education may reduce social inequality by enhancing the educational participation of the lower class and improving its future economic prospects.
In contrast, evidence on the association between personal economic wellbeing and attitudes towards public spending on policies that are not necessarily 'redistributive' is absent from the literature. Only in the case of public safety is there some empirical evidence based on hedonic pricing models. Employing information on housing prices and wages from 113 US cities, Clark and Cosgrove (1990) found that willingness to pay for public safety increases with income. Using a formal theoretical model, they argue that public safety is a normal good.
We further hypothesise that the well-to-do prefer lower taxes and less public debt. The first conjecture is based on the notion that publicly provided goods and services 8. Details on explanatory variables can be found in the Appendix. are primarily financed through a progressive income tax. Utilising data from the German ALLBUS survey, Hennighausen and Heinemann (2015) provided evidence that high-income earners tend to oppose a progressive tax scheme. 9 The second claim is supported by several empirical findings suggesting that personal economic well-being is positively related to preferences for fiscal consolidation (e.g. Hayo and Neumeier, 2017; Heinemann and Hennighausen, 2012; Stix, 2013) .
We thus expect personal economic well-being to be inversely related to the first principal component, as 'capital-spending orientation' is positively related to spending on education and negatively to cutting taxes and repaying debt. In contrast, the association between economic well-being and the second principal component ought to be positive, as 'fiscal-consolidation orientation' reflects a desire to reduce public debt and social security spending.
The survey contains three indicators for respondents' personal economic wellbeing: (i) net monthly household income (in €1,000), (ii) homeownership as a proxy for the household's real assets (i.e. whether the respondent lives in a selfowned house, self-owned flat or a rented house/flat) and (iii) a subjective assessment of the interviewee's personal economic situation, ranging from 1 (absolutely dissatisfied) to 5 (absolutely satisfied).
Attitudes towards politics
Trust in politicians could be an important determinant of individual attitudes towards public spending, as people characterised by high trust may be less suspicious of government activity. Many political economy approaches assume that policy-makers manipulate the level and composition of public expenditure in their own self-interest, including political budget cycle theory, rent-seeking approaches and pork-barrel spending models (e.g. Alesina et al., 1997; Lizzeri and Persico, 2001; Rogoff and Sibert, 1988) . Arguably, people who share this view of politicians' motives are more likely to oppose public spending hikes and opt for a lean state. Accordingly, they should be relatively more likely to favour tax cuts over spending hikes, which implies a positive relationship between trust in politicians and the first principal component. In addition, we expect respondents who lack trust in politicians to have consolidation-oriented preferences.
In our survey, we measure interviewees' attitudes towards politics with four pairs of contradictory statements. Three of these capture different dimensions of trust in politicians; the fourth assesses preferences for redistribution. We asked whether interviewees believe that politicians (i) act according to the general public interest versus only in the interest of particular groups, (ii) are concerned about the country's long-term well-being versus being concerned only about the next election and (iii) manage tax revenues conscientiously versus are wasteful with tax revenues. In each case, we inquired with which statement, on a fivepoint scale, the respondents agree most. If people are particularly suspicious of 9. Based on survey data from the United States, Slemrod (2006) , however, does not find that income is significantly related to the belief that the progressive tax scheme should be replaced by a flat tax. In addition, Ackert et al. (2007) provide experimental evidence that tax preferences are characterised by fairness concerns and inequality aversion. See also Hettich and Winer (1997) for a review on the political economy of taxation. government activity in one or more specific policy area, we would expect to see them prefer lower spending. Additionally, we asked the interviewees about whether they think that (iv) the state should ensure equal living conditions versus the state not interfering in peoples' living conditions. By means of this item, we capture the respondents' inclination towards an egalitarian attitude. Arguably, people characterised by an egalitarian attitude may be more likely to opt for higher spending in policy areas that can be considered 'redistributive' and that reduce social inequality. The most important examples of these policy areas are social security and public education, which suggests a positive association between an egalitarian attitude and both principal components. In addition, Kaplanoglou et al. (2015) provide evidence that fiscal consolidation programmes have a higher likelihood of success if they have fewer consequences for the economically deprived. Arguably, this finding may indicate that concerns for equality or fairness are closely related to public support for fiscal consolidation.
Economic literacy
Following the recent financial and economic crises, many governments accumulated large public debt, which implies that many publicly provided goods and services were deficit financed. Arguably, awareness of the future burden associated with deficit spending may affect peoples' attitudes towards public expenditure. Persons who lack information about the costs of public indebtedness may be less reluctant to opt for public spending hikes than those who are able to assess the future burden of public debt (e.g. Buchanan and Wagner, 1977) . However, given their lack of knowledge, they also may be less inclined to call for fiscal consolidation measures. Consequently, we expect that economic literacy or knowledge about the costs of public debt incurrence is inversely related to the first principal component and positively to the second one.
Our survey contains three multiple-choice questions designed to assess interviewees' knowledge of economic variables that are important for assessing public debt: we asked about (i) the size of the federal government's budget deficit in 2012 (in relation to GDP), (ii) the current interest rate on government bonds with a maturity of 10 years and (iii) 2012s inflation rate. In each case, the interviewees could choose between four answers. To evaluate the influence of knowledge on attitudes towards public spending priorities, we employ three dummy variables indicating whether the respective question has been answered correctly.
With regard to peoples' fiscal preferences, their subjective assessments about the government's fiscal position might be relevant Neumeier, 2016a, 2017) . Irrespective of the actual situation, if respondents believe that the costs of public debt incurrence are high, then they may be more likely to favour fiscal consolidation. To evaluate the importance of the interviewees' beliefs about Germany's fiscal position, we employ the answers to the multiple-choice knowledge questions as explanatory variables.
In addition, we account for interviewees' level of formal education, thus capturing the effect of schooling. We differentiate between respondents who completed lower secondary school (Hauptschule), middle secondary school (Realschule) and upper secondary school (Abitur).
Party preferences
Party preferences might be a particularly important source of variation in individual preferences for public spending priorities. There is a wide range of political parties in Germany. For instance, leftist parties such as the SPD or the Left Party argue in support of a strong welfare state, whereas the FDP is a proponent of the free market. The CDU/CSU stands for the conservative political centre, whereas the Green Party reflects a mix of alternative ideas and liberal bourgeoisie. To achieve some insight into the association between party preferences and preferences for public spending priorities, all respondents were asked which party they would vote for if elections were held next Sunday. The respondents could choose between seven major German parties: the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), the Left Party, the Green Party, the Pirates, the Liberal Democratic Party (FDP), and the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). Alternatively, the respondents could state that they would vote for a different party or that they would not vote at all.
Time preferences
In theoretical studies, time preferences are believed to be an important determinant of attitudes towards public indebtedness (e.g. Huber and Runkel, 2008) . Empirical evidence tends to support this conjecture, suggesting that people who are forward-looking are more likely to oppose public debt incurrence and support fiscal consolidation (Hayo and Neumeier, 2017; Stix, 2013) . Is there reason to suspect that time preferences are linked to preferences over public spending priorities as well? Arguably, benefits deriving from spending hikes on some items are immediately visible, whereas those deriving from other items are realised in the future, perhaps not even benefitting the current generation. For instance, increases in social security spending tend to fall into the former category, whereas capital-oriented-spendingi.e., spending hikes on education and infrastructurebelong to the latter, as they can be considered investments in the economy's (human) capital stock. Like in other cases of delayed rewards, individual preferences for spending hikes and cuts on items belonging to one or the other category might be affected by the respondent's degree of forward-lookingness. Hence, people who are particularly concerned about the present may prefer higher spending in areas yielding immediate benefits and spending cuts in areas where welfare losses occur sometime in the future. And, indeed, empirical evidence indicates that a person's future orientation or degree of patience is positively related to willingness to delay rewards (e.g. Ainslie, 1975; Thaler and Shefrin, 1981) .
Within the framework of the survey, two 'experiments' were conducted to assess interviewees' time preferences. 10 In the first experiment, respondents were asked to choose between a safe payoff of €1,000 paid immediately and a higher 10. The set-up of our 'experiments' is shown in Appendix C. The term 'experiments' is placed in quotation marks as they were not incentivised. However, both the set-up and the wording were taken from the questionnaire of the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP), where the experiment was incentivised. As the distribution of answers in our data is very similar to the one in the SOEP data, we are confident that the lack of a material incentive in our version of the experiment had no notable effect on interviewees' choices.
payoff of €X i,6 paid in six months. In the second experiment, the choice was between a safe payoff of €1,000 paid in six months and a higher payoff of €X i,12 paid in 12 months. The respondents' choices of X i,6 and X i,12 are then used to compute (i) the marginal rate of substitution between two consecutive future periods, i.e., b = 1,000/X i,12 and (ii) the respondents' degree of short-run impatience, defined as d ¼ X i;12 =X i;6 (Angeletos et al., 2001; Laibson, 1997) . The rationale for conducting two 'experiments' is that people are often found to be more impatient in the short run than in the long run, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as 'myopia' and one that can cause time-inconsistent behaviour. In the event that the additional discount parameter d is smaller than one, the rate of time preference declines and a person's discount function is hyperbolic (e.g. Frederick et al., 2002; Thaler and Shefrin, 1981) . Both theoretical (Huber and Runkel, 2008) and empirical (Hayo and Neumeier, 2017) evidence suggest that both the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution and the extent of short-run impatience affect peoples' attitudes towards fiscal consolidation. 11 Peoples' time perspective could also be related to specific sociodemographic characteristics. For example, given their shorter remaining lifetime, older respondents may be less future-oriented than younger ones. Retired persons may not be very interested in education, as they have left the labour market. In addition, given their own need for resources, they may not care very much about infrastructure investment, which primarily benefits future generations. Moreover, if we define utility maximisation to include caring for other individuals, respondents with children may be more future-oriented. To capture these effects, we include corresponding sociodemographic variables as additional covariates in our model.
Gender
There is empirical evidence indicating that women tend to have a stronger preference for redistribution and equality than do men (e.g. Alesina and Giuliano, 2009; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Corneo and Gr€ uner, 2002) . Consequently, we expect females to support public spending on redistributive policies, i.e., social security and education, implying a positive association with the first principal component and a negative association with the second one.
Other controls
Our empirical model contains several additional explanatory variables. We control for the respondent's employment status [regularly employed (reference category), unemployed, student, retiree or homemaker] and marital status [single (reference category), living with a partner, married, or widowed or divorced]. Our empirical model also includes dummies indicating in which state (Bundesland) the respondent resides. Finally, we assessed the interviewees' risk preferences by means of an 'experiment'. We confronted the interviewees with the 11. In our sample, we observe an unexpectedly high number of interviewees who choose the immediate payment irrespective of what future payoff they are offered. Interestingly, a similar distribution of answers is found in the SOEP data. A possible explanation for this finding is that respondents who are particularly risk averse chose this option. To control for possible spill-over effects and measurement errors, we include additional dummy variables for these categories.
choice of either receiving a safe payoff of €X or taking part in a lottery in which they could win either €1,000 or nothing (odds are 50:50). The choice of X is then used to compute an individual's risk preference parameter, which varies between À1 (maximum risk aversion) and +1 (maximum risk propensity). Table 2 summarises our hypotheses. A '+' signifies that we expect a positive association, 'À' an inverse relationship and '?' that we do not have a prior. Table 3 shows the results for Equation (1), i.e., the OLS regressions with the two principal components as dependent variables. The first two columns contain the results for the first principal component, capturing capital-spending-oriented preferences, columns 3 and 4 for the second principal component, indicating fiscal-consolidation-oriented preferences. In both specifications, we start by estimating a general model including the full set 55 covariates (including dummy variables for the 16 German states). To identify significant explanatory variables while taking collinearity into account, as well as to increase estimation efficiency, we apply general-to-specific modelling and eliminate insignificant regressors using a consistent testing-down procedure (Hendry, 2000) . In our interpretations, we focus on the results obtained for the reduced models.
RESULTS
Baseline specification
With regard to personal economic well-being, all three indicators appear to be important correlates of individual preferences for public spending priorities. However, the single indicators are related to different dimensions of fiscal preferences. In line with our prior, we find that the better the personal economic situation, the stronger a respondent's support for public debt reduction. Both household income as well as subjective economic well-being are positively related to fiscal-consolidation-oriented preferences. However, the economic effects are modest. An increase in household income (subjective economic well- being) of €1,000 (one point) is associated with an increase in the consolidationpreferences indicator of about 0.05 standard deviations. Our wealth indicator also survives the model reduction, but is only relevant for capital-spendingoriented preferences. 12 Again, the sign matches our expectations, as property owners tend to oppose spending hikes. Supporting our conjecture, time preference appears to be an important correlate of fiscal preferences. In both regressions, the discount parameter b survives the testing-down procedure. In the case of consolidation-oriented preferences, it shows the expected sign. The greater a person's concern about the future, the more likely he or she is to a call for public debt reduction. In contrast, hyperbolic discounting does not matter with regard to respondents' fiscal preferences, as the discount parameter d does not remain in the reduced model. For an idea of the magnitude of the effect for a realistic change in b, we consider an increase of one standard deviation (0.2). Such an increase in b would imply an increase in the consolidation-preference indicator of 0.1 standard deviations. Thus, we find support for the hypothesis listed in Table 2 . Contradicting our prior, however, forward-lookingness appears to be negatively related to individual preferences for capital-oriented public spending.
Turning to the other variables related to peoples' concern about the future, we find that older people are more inclined to support additional capital-oriented 12. Note that household income is significantly positive in the general model, which would not be in line with the hypothesis laid out in Table 2 . However, given that the variable does not survive the reduction process indicates a relatively weak statistical association.
spending as well as public debt reduction, which contradicts our prior for both types of preferences. Moreover, retirement as well as having children do not appear to be significantly related to fiscal preferences. This raises doubt about the egotropic perspective often assumed in the theoretical literature dealing with policy reforms (see, e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 2000) , namely, that the individual conditions of economic actors in terms of age or children lead to support for short-term-oriented policies by older and/or childless people. In fact, at least with regard to age, we find evidence supporting the opposite view. 13 Regarding the indicators for economic literacy, we find that only knowledge about the interest rate on government bonds remains in the reduced models. Its coefficient is sizeable, though. Respondents who are informed about the interest rate paid on government debt are more likely to support an increase in capitaloriented public spending as well as public debt reduction. The corresponding indicators increase by 0.15 and 0.2 standard deviations respectively. The positive coefficients suggest that well-informed economic actors are more likely to have coherent budget preferences compared to less informed ones. Moreover, objective knowledge about the interest rate is more highly associated with the fiscalconsolidation orientation than with the capital-spending orientation, albeit the difference is not statistically significant.
Subjective assessment of the fiscal position appears to be of some relevance, at least with regard to capital-spending-oriented preferences. The higher respondents believe the interest rate to be, the more likely they are to favour spending hikes on education and infrastructure over tax cuts. We interpret this finding as suggesting that a share of respondents favouring capital-spending believe that this is the right budgetary approach and should be pursued, irrespective of the opportunity costs. The coefficient of the believed inflation rate shows a significantly negative sign with respect to the capital-spending orientation. Arguably, one explanation for why respondents who believe inflation to be high oppose an increase in public expenditure is that they fear a further acceleration of prices due to higher government expenditure. However, all the effects of the subjective knowledge indicators are of modest size.
The level of formal education is important as well. Respondents with a higher secondary school degree (Abitur) are characterised by capital-spending-oriented and fiscal-consolidation-oriented preferences. The coefficients have the same signs as for economic literacy, but are even larger. Having completed higher secondary school is associated with an increase in the capital-spending preference indicator (consolidation-preference indicator) by roughly 0.4 (0.26) standard deviations.
A glance at the effects of our trust indicators reveals that fiscal preferences are hardly related to peoples' confidence in politicians. The only trust indicator that survives the model reduction measures the interviewees' appraisal of the government's fiscal competence. However, the effect is weak, both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance. Thus, in general, we find no evidence supporting our hypothesis about the association between trust in politicians and 13. Note that the use of age as a variable suffers from a potential identification problem, as it may proxy for differences across cohorts of individuals who were socialised at different points in time rather than measuring the influence of age as such.
fiscal preferences. Note that his finding is in sharp contrast to assumptions regularly made in public choice or political economy models (Mueller, 2003) . We detect a statistically stronger effect for the respondents' propensity towards egalitarianism. In line with our conjecture, respondents with redistributive preferences prefer spending hikes over tax cuts and oppose fiscal consolidation. Taking into account its standard deviation (1.2), the effect of a realistic change in this indicator is 0.06 and 0.07 standard deviations in the explained variables, respectively, which we consider to be small. The impact of supporting different political parties differs notably between the two fiscal preferences. In the case of capital-spending orientation, we find a negative coefficient only for respondents supporting the Pirate Party. In economic terms, this effect is sizable, as the explained variable decreases by almost 0.27 standard deviations. In statistical terms, however, the effect is weak. Quite the opposite is found when looking at the estimation results for fiscal-consolidation orientation. Here, the likelihood that Pirate Party supporters favour this strategy is positive. While statistical significance is again not particularly high, the explained variable increases by 0.23 standard deviations, which is the strongest effect in the political party dimension. Positive coefficients of lesser magnitude are found for FDP (0.22 standard deviations), Other Parties (0.19 standard deviations), Green Party (0.14 standard deviations) and CDU (0.13 standard deviations). It may appear surprising that supporters of the conservative CDU are not more in favour of fiscal consolidation. However, results from other studies of what politicians do when in office suggest that the CDU is not particularly more debt averse than, for instance, the SPD (e.g. Galli and Rossi, 2002; .
Women are characterised by capital-spending-oriented preferences and oppose fiscal consolidation. This finding is well in line with the extant empirical literature documenting that females tend to show stronger support for redistributive policies than do men (e.g. Alesina and Giuliano, 2009; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Corneo and Gr€ uner, 2002) . However, the effects are modest. Being female is associated with an increase in the first principal component of 0.11 standard deviations and a decrease in the second one by 0.13 standard deviations.
Extended specifications
Next, we turn to the estimation results for Equations (2) and (3) in which the correlates of individuals' preferences for public spending in different policy areas taxes and public debtare studied separately. The results based on ordered logit maximum likelihood estimation are in Appendix D. Table 1D contains the estimates for the scenario in which respondents had to account for the public budget constraint (Scenario A); Table 2D for the scenario in which unexpected additional funds were available (Scenario B). To conserve space, we only report the coefficients of the latent variable models in Tables 1D and 2D .
Tables 1D and 2D reveal that the estimates explaining individual attitudes towards public spending in various policy areas are very similar, both in terms of sign and p-values, across the scenario assuming a fiscal budget constraint and the one in which money arrives out of the blue. Thus, it seems that peoples' attitudes towards public spending are not affected by a public budget constraint. To Preferences for Government Spending Priorities confirm this impression and test whether the results across Equations (2) and (3) are statistically different, we apply seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation. For each different policy area, we estimate two binary SUR equations, which differ only with respect to the dependent variable. In the first equation, the binary dependent variable refers to the scenario in which the public budget constraint must be taken into account. In the second equation, the binary dependent variable refers to the scenario in which unexpected additional funds become available. The left-hand-side variables take the value 1 if the interviewee opts for a spending hike in the respective policy area (or a decrease in taxes or public debt, respectively) and 0 if she prefers not to change public spending in that area or even advocates for a spending cut (or no change/an increase in taxes or public debt). We then testfor each policy area separatelywhether the coefficients in both equations are equal. Our findings indicate that the impact of our explanatory variables on individual attitudes towards public spending priorities is the same across both scenarios. For each single policy area, the null hypothesis that all coefficients are indistinguishable cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of significance. This conclusion also holds with respect to public debt reduction. Only with regard to tax cuts do the coefficients differ statistically significantly between the two scenarios. 14 This finding is not only interesting in the current context but also has more general implications for survey methodology. The two scenarios are notably different in terms of their complexity and the intellectual demand they place on interviewees. Requiring respondents to consider the public budget constraint not only makes designing the survey instrument more difficult but it also has consequences for the manner in which the interviews are conducted. For instance, a scenario assuming a budget constraint is less suited for a telephone survey; its complexity can be more easily dealt with by using computer-assisted face-to-face interviews.
The results displayed in Tables 1D and 2D reveal a more detailed picture of peoples' preferences for public spending priorities than the estimates based on Equation (1) in which the principal components were employed as dependent variables. However, in general, the results for Equations (2) and (3) are in line with the findings from our baseline specification. For instance, a higher household income makes a call for public debt reduction more likely as well as opposition to additional spending on social security. This result holds irrespective of whether or not the interviewees had to take the public budget constraint into account. Subjective economic well-being appears to be particularly important with regard to individual preferences for social security spending. The poorer a person feels, the more likely she is to support additional spending on social security. In Scenario A, a one-point decrease in the respective indicator is associated with an almost 3 pp higher likelihood of opting for a spending hike in that area. In Scenario B, the likelihood of choosing additional spending on social security 14. This result is driven by the trust indicators. The null that the coefficients of the trust measures are equal across both equations can be rejected at the 1% level (p = 0.0067). People who have confidence in politicians' motives and competence are more reluctant to opt for a tax cut if there is a budget constraint.
as the most preferred alternative for the use of unexpected funds increases by 1.5 pp if the respective indicator decreases by one point. Supporting our conjecture, time preference appears to be a particularly important determinant of individual attitudes towards public debt incurrence. The greater a person's concern about the future, the more likely he or she is to a call for public debt reduction. The effect is of considerable magnitude: in Scenario A, a one-point increase in the discount parameter b implies a 15 pp greater likelihood of favouring a public debt cut. In Scenario B, the likelihood that repaying debt is the most preferred alternative for the use of unexpected tax revenues increases by 16 pp in response to a one-point hike in b. Cutting public spending on social security appears to be the preferred consolidation measure of forwardlooking respondents. A one-point hike in b invokes a more than 7 pp higher likelihood of opting for a welfare spending cut and a 16 pp lower likelihood of calling for more spending in that area. Older people appear to support public debt reduction; at the same time, they oppose additional spending on education and call for tax cuts. We also obtain particularly large estimates for our education indicators. Respondents who completed higher secondary school (Abitur) are 20 pp more likely to call for additional spending on education and 12 pp more likely to opt for an increase in infrastructure investment than are interviewees with a lower secondary school degree (Hauptschule; reference category). At the same time, the better educated have a 11 pp higher likelihood of supporting fiscal consolidation (Scenario A). Turning to Scenario B, the likelihood of ranking additional spending on education first (reducing public debt) increases by 13 pp (4 pp) if the interviewee has a higher secondary school degree.
The effects of our trust indicators reveal that those who regard politicians as fiscally incompetent are strongly in favour of a tax cut. Specifically, in Scenario A, a one-point decrease in the respective indicator (implying stronger support for the notion that the government is wasteful with tax revenues) raises the probability of supporting a tax cut by 5.5 pp. In Scenario B, the likelihood of ranking cutting taxes first increases by almost 2 pp. At the same time, interviewees who consider the government to be wasteful with tax revenues would like to see more spending on education, indicating the belief that tax money may be better spent in this area. Although the German welfare system has been permanently under reform during the past decades and the subject of heated public debate, confidence in politicians' motives and competence does not have a statistically significant influence on attitudes towards spending on social security. Propensity towards egalitarianism exerts a notable influence on attitudes towards public spending in policy areas that tend to reduce social inequality. In line with our conjecture, respondents with an egalitarian attitude have a higher probability of supporting more spending on social security and education, and tend to disfavour additional spending on defence.
Supporters of different political parties differ notably in their attitudes towards welfare spending. In line with our conjecture, voters for the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and the Liberal Democratic Party (FDP) are significantly less likely than voters of the Left Party (reference group) or voters for the Social Democrats (SPD) and Green Party to prefer spending more on social security. FDP voters are especially reluctant to support an expansion of the welfare state; they are 13.9 pp more likely to opt for a cut in social security spending and 22.8 pp less likely to call Preferences for Government Spending Priorities for a welfare spending hike compared to voters of the Left Party (Scenario A). Differences between political camps with respect to public spending on other areas are generally negligible, although there are some notable differences regarding public revenues. Supporters of the left-wing parties, i.e., SPD, the Left Party, and the Green Party, are significantly more likely to call for a tax hike than are nonvoters and those who vote for right-wing parties, i.e., the CDU and FDP, indicating that they would like to see an expansion of the public sector. Yet again, differences between political camps with regard to attitudes towards public debt incurrence or reduction, respectively, are less pronounced.
Differences across West and East Germany
We now investigate whether our findings are different for respondents living in West Germany compared to those living in East Germany. Before German reunification in 1989, the East German states made up the socialist German Democratic Republic, and traces of this socialist heritage are still evident. The East German states continue to lag behind the West German states with regard to macroeconomic conditions, especially per capita GDP, income and infrastructure. Moreover, survey-based evidence indicates that political attitudes also continue to be significantly different between the two parts of the country. For instance, East Germans are characterised by greater inequality aversion (Corneo and Gr€ uner, 2002) as well as higher preferences for redistribution (Alesina and Fuchs-Sch€ undeln, 2007) .
To estimate separate coefficients for respondents living in West Germany and those living in East Germany, we include two dummy variables in Equation (1) and interact both of them with our explanatory variables. The first dummy variable takes on the value 1 if a respondent resides in West Germany, and the second dummy variable equals 1 when the respondent lives in East Germany. Estimating separate coefficients in a nested specification using interaction terms allows testing whether the coefficients differ significantly between the subgroups. The results are given in Table 3D of the Appendix. The first two columns show the results for the first principal component capturing capital-spending-oriented preferences, and columns 3 and 4 for the second principal component indicating consolidation-oriented preferences.
A glance at the third row from the bottom of Table 3D indicates that in both models, the null hypothesis of equal coefficients across West and East Germans must be rejected. In the first model, though, the differences are only significant at the 10% level. In contrast, in the second model, the differences are significant at the 1% level. Testing the coefficients for each group of explanatory variables separately reveals that this finding is driven by the indicators for party preferences. In contrast, the null of equal coefficients for the indicators of economic well-being, time preferences, economic literacy and political attitudes across West and East German respondents cannot be rejected in either of the models. 15
15. In the model in which the first (second) principal component is employed as the dependent variable, the p-value of the corresponding F-test is 0.64 (0.86) for the indicators capturing the respondents' economic situation, 0.44 (0.99) for the time preference indicators, 0.01 (0.21) for the indicators of economic literacy, 0.34 (0.52) for the trust indicators, and 0.41 (0.001) for the variables indicating which party the respondent supports.
Turning to the consolidation-preferences indicator, the differences in the coefficients appear sizeable. Among East German citizens, there seems to be a stronger divide between supporters of the Left Party and those of other major parties. East German supporters of the SPD, Green Party and the CDU are significantly more likely to opt for consolidation measures than supporters of the Left Party; they are also more likely to call for fiscal consolidation than are West German supporters of the same parties. 16 In contrast, among West German citizens, there are hardly any differences with regard to consolidation preferences across supporters of different parties.
CONCLUSION
Following the financial crisis, public expenditure-to-GDP ratios increased greatly in most developed countries. This paper examines the demand for public spending in several policy areas using a unique dataset from a representative household survey carried out in Germany at the beginning of 2013. The interviewees were asked about their attitudes towards public spending in different areas (social security, public safety, education, infrastructure, economic development, defence and miscellaneous) as well as about their views on taxation and public indebtedness. Our findings suggest that majority voting would yield very few changes in the level of public spending in diverse policy areas or in the composition of public expenditure respectively. The only policy area in which a spending cut is preferred by a majority of respondents is defence. In the case of public spending on education, roughly 61% opt for higher expenditures. The share of respondents favouring tax cuts (about 32%) is notably larger than the share calling for an increase in taxes (roughly 18%). This is an interesting finding, given the upcoming federal election, as tax policy plays a role in the electoral campaigns of major parties in Germany.
Using principal component analysis, we find that respondents can be categorised into two groups. The first group prefers capital-spending-oriented government expenditures, that is, this group wants to increase public spending on education and infrastructure, i.e., human and physical capital. The second group is characterised by fiscal-consolidation-oriented preferences; this group would like to see a reduction of public debt and is against any increase in social welfare spending.
Our dataset contains detailed information about the interviewees, allowing us to investigate the factors associated with individual attitudes towards different fiscal policy measures. Using theoretical and empirical findings from the literature, we develop a number of testable conjectures and find that individual fiscal preferences differ notably across respondents. Economic well-being, confidence in politicians, economic knowledge, and time and party preferences are all statistically significantly related to preferences for public spending, tax policy and public debt. The magnitude of our estimates is particularly large for time preference, economic knowledge and party preference. Respondents who are 16. The p-value for the test of equal coefficients for supporters of the SPD across West and East Germany is 0.05, for supporters of the Green Party 0.01 and for the CDU 0.09. particularly forward-looking, well informed about debt-related economic variables, i.e., have good economic knowledge, and who vote for the liberal party FDP tend to have particularly strong preferences for fiscal consolidation. Thus, the common assumption made in public choice research that voters differ only along a single dimension does not appear to be realistic. Moreover, we find that preferences for public spending are almost unaffected by consideration of the public budget constraint. Hence, the share of respondents who opt for additional spending in any particular policy area is approximately the same, irrespective of whether spending hikes involve costs (such as decreasing spending in another policy area or increasing taxes or public debt) or unexpected additional funds are available. This finding has important implications for survey methodology, as it suggests that it may not be necessary to design complicated survey questions and use expensive interview methods to obtain people's preferences towards public expenditure.
Like all research methods, our survey-based approach may have a few drawbacks. First, we are measuring stated preferences and not revealed preferences, which are not necessarily the same. With regard to individual attitudes towards public spending priorities, though, the identification of revealed preferences is a challenging task. For the case of public safety, Clark and Cosgrove (1990) tried to address this concern using data on crime rates and house prices in the United States to infer individual willingness-to-pay functions, but it is unclear whether they were able to overcome the obstacles. However, measurement error may occur in both directions and, thus, cancel out across the sample. Second, the estimates we obtain based on regression analyses do not have a causal interpretation. We believe, though, that identifying the most important correlates of fiscal preferences is both informative and highly policy relevant. Finally, our respondents' answers may depend on the political and economic context. Our survey was conducted in 2013, a time at which the sovereign debt crisis in Europe was still an important topic for the media. Between 2007 and 2012, the debt-to-GDP ratio of the German general government rose from 65% to 81%. In 2010, the German federal government introduced several austerity measures, the most important one being a noticeable decrease in social security spending. Since then, though, media headlines have been dominated by very different topics, for example, the worsening relationship between Europe and Russia and the refugee crisis. In 2015, there were many reports about the poor state of the German army's equipment, which could have had an influence on our finding that people prefer a reduction of the defence share. It may very well be that these events influenced peoples' fiscal preferences and the attitudes respondents' expressed in our survey. Thus, it would be interesting to rerun the survey and check for shifts in the public's opinion about the government's fiscal stance.
APPENDIX A
Explanatory variables HH income
Monthly net household income in €1,000. In the raw dataset, households are sorted into one of 11 income classes. In the empirical analysis, we consider the centre of each class Subjective well-being Interviewer: Please start with row 1 and the question 'How do you choose? 0 safe or chance of winning 1,000/0?'. If the interviewee chooses option B, please proceed with row 2 and the question 'How do you choose? 100 safe or chance of winning 1,000/0?'. The experiment ends when the interviewee chooses option A for the first time. Please write down the number of the row in which the respondent chose option A for the first time.
Option A was first chosen in row number: h
In the next experiment you decide according to the following table (Interviewer: Please show the table below). In each row you see two alternatives. You can choose between a safe payoff of 1,000 which is paid to you immediately and a higher safe payoff which will be paid to you in 6 months. You start in row 1 and then proceed row by row. In each row, please choose between the safe payoff of 1,000 to be paid immediately (column A) and the higher safe payoff to be paid in 6 months (column B). The payoff on the left remains the same in all rows. Only the payoff on the right increases from row to row. . In each row you see two alternatives. You can choose between a safe payoff of 1,000 which is paid to you in 6 months and a higher safe payoff which will be paid to you in 12 months. You start in row 1 and then proceed row by row. In each row, please choose between the safe payoff of 1,000 to be paid in 6 months (column A) and the higher safe payoff to be paid in 12 months (column B). The payoff on the left remains the same in all rows. Only the payoff on the right increases from row to row. (1). White (1980) robust standard errors are used. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. (93, 1948) 3.20*** 3.58*** Notes: Results are based on OLS estimation. The dependent variables are the principal components described in section 2. White (1980) robust standard errors are used. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
